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Beast of Undue Burden: The Interplay of Technology Assisted Review and the Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
Matthew Miller, J.D. Candidate 
ABSTRACT 
 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules” or “the Rules”) mandates that 
all documents relevant to litigation are to be given to the opposing party during discovery. As 
more and more business’s records are stored electronically, courts have struggled with how to 
adequately address the burden of production regarding large quantities of electronically stored 
information (“ESI”). Discovery of ESI (“eDiscovery”) has often proven to be unduly 
burdensome, both for the courts and the litigating parties. Frequently, the cost of properly 
identifying relevant documents is prohibitively high for litigants with limited resources. Thus, 
many litigations result in the over-production of documents in an attempt to make the litigation 
too costly to proceed with.  
Both legislators and vendors have attempted to combat this abuse of eDiscovery by 
proposing amendments to the Rules governing discovery requests and by creating tools that 
simplify the eDiscovery process, respectively. The tools produced by these vendors employ 
various computer technologies and statistical techniques and are referred to by vendors as 
“technology assisted review” or more colloquially, “predictive coding.” Predictive coding uses 
machine learning to teach a computer to identify relevant documents out of large datasets. 
Predictive coding can dramatically decrease the cost of producing documents from large sets of 
ESI, thus preventing over-production of ESI for the purposes of making litigation prohibitively 
expensive.  
In 2013, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed a number of changes to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many of them pertaining to reducing the cost and time of 
modern discovery. This article will focus on the changes to Rule 26, and Rule 34 (The Rule 
governing the production of ESI) to the extent that it depends on Rule 26, as well as the 
implications that predictive coding might have in consideration of the proposed amendments. 
Part I of this article will review Rules 26 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Part II will give a history of modern eDiscovery and a walkthrough of a technology assisted 
review. Part III will summarize the Court’s treatment of technology assisted review in the 
relevant case law addressing. Part IV will examine the proposed amendments, the considerations 
informing the proposed amendments, and technology assisted review’s role in the proposed 
eDiscovery system. The article then concludes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this day and age computers are at the forefront of almost every industry. Year after 
year, more and more aspects of the business world become digitized. With this rampant 
digitization come new issues related to litigation. Such issues include: when electronically stored 
information (“ESI”) can be deleted1, what constitutes acceptable media for storing ESI, and how 
to process and analyze ESI before producing said information pursuant to a litigation. Further, 
because the best practices surrounding ESI seemingly shift with the tide, attorneys must be ever-
diligent in staying informed with respect to relevant technology and the law surrounding its use. 
At the heart of any discussion involving burdens of production associated with discovery 
is Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 26”). Rule 26 outlines the metes and 
bounds of what information a party to a litigation must turn over to their adversary at the 
beginning of a trial. This process is known as “discovery.” In short, Rule 26 mandates that a 
party must produce the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all parties who might have 
discoverable information.
2
 Unsurprisingly, an attorney presented with this incredibly broad 
language in the face of a potentially staggering amount of ESI has a number of challenges to 
overcome. For example, review of these documents can be both time-consuming for the attorney 
and expensive for the client. 
Moreover, many clients are either unwilling or unable to pay a small fleet of attorneys to 
review their large amount of potentially discoverable documents. This cost at the onset of 
litigation can act as a stumbling block for a party wishing to assert their rights. Even further, 
many attorneys use Rule 26’s burden of production to “game” their adversaries. This is achieved 
by producing far more than simply the relevant information. Overproduction has always been an 
                                                        
1
 See Christopher B. Little, Zubulake and the Duty to Preserve Electronically Stored Data, 37 The Colorado Lawyer 
95 (September 2008). 
2
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
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issue in large litigations
3
, but in today’s world, the sheer magnitude of many companies’ ESI 
allows attorneys to make discovery unduly burdensome for their adversaries to review. An 
example of this overproduction that has received attention from the media is in the recent Apple 
v. Samsung patent litigation, where both parties produced millions of documents during 
discovery.
 4
 In this case, both parties were large enough to parse through a production of that 
magnitude, however, it is not uncommon for there to be a large disparity in the resources of the 
two parties. In such situations, overproduction of ESI
5
 is used as a sword to make the cost of 
litigation too expensive for the smaller party to realistically pursue.
6
 On the other side of the 
same coin, are the challenges associated with sorting through one’s own documents to 
sufficiently respond to an adversary’s discovery request. However, regardless of an attorney’s 
role, the magnitude of modern ESI coupled with the burdens of Rule 26 present many challenges.  
As clients are increasingly faced with the problem of sorting through millions of pieces of 
ESI, a number of vendors appear to have addressed this issue. These vendors specialize in 
                                                        
3
 See Patricia Groot, Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery with Limits on Abuse, 2009 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, *37-38 (2009). 
4
 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics, Ltd., et al., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
5
 It should be noted that the 2006 advisory committee note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 34, states that 
“[t]he production of electronically stored information should be subject to comparable requirements to protect 
against deliberate or inadvertent production in ways that raise unnecessary obstacles for the requesting party.” 
However, a discussion of the remedies provided by Rule 34 is outside the scope of this article. FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
6
 Ralph Losey, Day One of  Predictive Coding Narrative: Searching for Relevance in the Ashes of Enron, e-
Discovery Team (July 1, 2012, 4:37pm), http://e-discoveryteam.com/2012/07/01/day-one-of-a-predictive-coding-
narrative-searching-for-relevance-in-the-ashes-of-enron/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2013) (quoting Bondi v. Capital & Fin. 
Asset Mgmt. S.A., 535 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2008) ”This Court . . . has taken note of the pressures upon corporate 
defendants to settle securities fraud ‘strike suits’ when those settlements are driven, not by the merits of plaintiffs’ 
claims, but by defendants’ fears of potentially astronomical attorneys’ fees arising from lengthy discovery.”); 
Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The PSLRA 
afforded district courts the opportunity in the early stages of litigation to make an initial assessment of the legal 
sufficiency of any claims before defendants were forced to incur considerable legal fees or, worse, settle claims 
regardless of their merit in order to avoid the risk of expensive, protracted securities litigation.”); Lander v. Hartford 
Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Because of the expense of defending such suits, issuers 
were often forced to settle, regardless of the merits of the action. PSLRA addressed these concerns by instituting . . . 
a mandatory stay of discovery so that district courts could first determine the legal sufficiency of the claims in all 
securities class actions.” (citations omitted)); Kassover v. UBS A.G., 08 Civ. 2753, 2008 WL 5395942 at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2008) (“PSLRA’s discovery stay provision was promulgated to prevent conduct such as: (a) 
filing frivolous securities fraud claims, with an expectation that the high cost of responding to discovery demands 
will coerce defendants to settle; and (b) embarking on a ‘fishing expedition’ or ‘abusive strike suit’ litigation.”)). 
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eDiscovery and have created tools to help litigants of all sizes lower their discovery costs. 
Recently, one particular class of tool has received much mention from legal practitioners and 
scholars alike “technology assisted review,” or more colloquially, “predictive coding.” Predictive 
coding refers to a specially configured computer that, with the help of an attorney, can learn how 
to identify relevant documents within a given dataset of any size. With the aid of this specially 
configured computer, an attorney is capable of reviewing a large amount of ESI at a significantly 
reduced cost.  
However, this reduced cost comes at the price of not having an attorney individually 
review all documents being sent to their adversary. This poses many potential problems, one of 
which is the focus of this paper.
7
  The first is whether, with the assistance of an attorney, a 
computer can accurately identify all relevant information sufficient to satisfy the burdens created 
by Rule 26. While legal scholars and practitioners agree that computers serve this purpose well, 
this article will discuss the methods that such a system employs while examining the underlying 
processes in detail.  
While vendors are looking to develop new technology, the legislature would like to adapt 
the current system of rules surrounding eDiscovery to address the aforementioned problems. 
While moving through the remaining sections, consider whether, in the wake of uninhibited 
growth of ESI and the tools used to process said ESI, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’ 
amendments to Rule 26 will be effective in facilitating, expediting the judicial process. This 
article will argue that the proposed amendments, particularly in light of the Court’s positive 
                                                        
7
 One such issue if the involuntary waiver of attorney-client privilege. For a discussion on involuntary waiver and 
the production of ESI, See generally Maura R. Grossman and Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in 
e-Discovery Can be More Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 
(2011). 
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treatment of technology assisted review, will effectively lower the time and costs associated with 
discovery and, consequently, significantly reduce malicious instances of overproduction of ESI. 
Part I of this article will review Rules 26 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Part II will give a history of modern eDiscovery and a walkthrough of a technology assisted 
review. Part III will summarize the Court’s treatment of technology assisted review in the 
relevant case law. Part IV will examine the proposed amendments, the considerations informing 
those propositions, and technology assisted review’s role in the proposed eDiscovery system. 
The article then concludes. 
I. RULES AND GUIDELINES ADDRESSING EDISCOVERY 
Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern discovery in the 
federal court system.
8
 Rules 26 and 34 work in conjunction to handle the discovery of ESI. Note 
that while this section describes the Rules as they currently stand, on August 15, 2013, “the 
Judicial Conference Advisory Committees on Bankruptcy and Civil Rules have proposed 
amendments to their respective rules and requested that the proposals be circulated to the bench, 
bar, and public for comment.” 9  The proposed amendments to Rule 26 are reproduced in 
Appendix A and the proposed amendments to Rule 34 are reproduced in Appendix C. The 
implications and merits of these amendments are discussed in Part IV, supra. 
Rule 26 commands that a copy of all documents, including electronically stored 
information that a disclosing party controls, is going to use, or may be used in support of that 
party’s claims or defenses must be presented.10 Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
                                                        
8
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
9
 Jeffery S. Sutton, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Memorandum, To the Bench, Bar, and Public: Request for Comments on Proposed Rules and Forms 
Amendments, August 15, 2013, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-
amendments.pdf. 
10
 This excludes information that is going to be presented for the sole purpose of impeachment. FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
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(“Rule 34”) discloses the scope of what must be produced pursuant to Rule 26(b). Further, the 
Sedona Conference, a leading lobbyist group, issues guidelines on how to manage ESI roughly 
every three years. Part III, supra, illustrates how the Court holds these guidelines in high regard 
and how they often inform judges’ opinions. The above rules and guidelines are traversed below. 
A. Rule 26 
As mentioned above, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the 
general rules surrounding discovery practice. Rule 26 contains a multitude of subparts, many of 
which have an entire body of law surrounding them.
11
 In sum, Rule 26 lists what disclosures are 
mandatory, the scope of the disclosures that must be made, the circumstances where granting a 
protective order regarding a disclosure is appropriate, the timing of when disclosures must be 
made, as well as when and how to supplement deficient disclosures.
12
 Rule 26 also mandates 
scheduling conferences between all parties and the presiding judge, as well as other formalistic 
requirements. While Rule 26 covers many areas of discovery, this article only delves into Rules 
26(b), 26(c), and 26(f). Rule 26(d) will also be discussed briefly.  
Rule 26(b) defines the limits and scope of discovery; Rule 26(b)(2)(B) delineates the 
specific limitations concerning ESI.
13
 That subsection of Rule 26 states that only ESI that is 
“reasonably accessible” must be produced. 14  One of the main factors relevant to this 
consideration is the potential for “undue burden or cost.” 15  Further, Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) 
mandates that courts “[o]n motion or on its own” limit the scope of discovery.16 This mandate 
also considers undue burden by balancing whether “the burden or expense of the proposed 
                                                        
11
 See full text supra Appendix A. 
12
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
13
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. 
16
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 
 
8 
 
discovery outweigh[s] its likely benefit.” 17  The risk of undue burden and costs grow 
proportionally with the magnitude of discoverable ESI. How the courts and legal practitioners 
are addressing these considerations strikes at the heart of this article.  
Rule 26(c) allows a party to move the court to grant a protective order regarding certain 
disclosures.
18
 That is, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a court is authorized to take a 
number of measures to “protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense” regarding any information produced in discovery.19 However, a court may 
only grant such a protective order if “the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to 
confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.”20 Rule 
26(d) discusses when discovery may be sought from the opposing party.
21
 
As mentioned, Rule 26(f) commands that all parties meet with each other prior to holding 
a scheduling conference with the judge presiding over the litigation.
22
 Under Rule 26(f)(3), 
parties are instructed to create a discovery plan that addresses, among other things, (1) any 
changes to the timing of discovery that should be made, (2) what subjects should be considered 
while making the required productions, (3) the form that discoverable ESI should be produced in, 
and (4) any limits to the scope of discovery.
23
 
B. Rule 34 
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the scope of discoverable ESI 
and the form that said ESI must take. However, Rule 34 was not always as expansive as it is 
                                                        
17
 Id. 
18
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
19
 For a list of protective orders the court is authorized to grant, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A)- FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(c)(1)(H). 
20
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
21
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d).  
22
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
23
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3). 
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today. In 1970, Congress officially recognized the practice of eDiscovery. Before 1970, when 
Congress amended Rule 34 to state that “[w]hen the data can as a practical matter be made 
usable by the discovering party only through respondent's devices, respondent may be required 
to use his devices to translate the data into usable form,” there was great dispute as to whether 
electronic information was discoverable.
24
 This is because the prior version of Rule 34 stated that 
parties merely needed to produce “documents,” without defining what constituted such a 
document.
25
 To address this ambiguity, the Committee wrote that the amendment “makes clear 
that Rule 34 applies to electronic data compilations,” dispelling any uncertainty about the Rule’s 
scope.
26
 It is salient to state that those same notes also recognize the potentially undue cost 
associated with the production of ESI: “The burden thus placed on respondent will vary from 
case to case, and the courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against 
undue burden of expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering party 
pay costs.”27 This expansive definition was explicitly incorporated into Rule 26 in the Advisory 
Committee’s 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.28  Additionally, the 
2006 amendments modernized and expanded the scope of Rule 34(a) to include “any designated 
documents or electronically stored information.”29 Further, Rule 34(b) states that a discovery 
request for ESI may specify the form in which the ESI is to be produced.
30
 If no form is stated, 
the ESI must be produced in the form it was stored in or another reasonable form.
31
 However, 
                                                        
24
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (1970). 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id.  
28
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2006). 
29
 FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 34(a). 
30
 FED. R. CIV. P.  Rule 34(b). 
31
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
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Rule 34(b) does not require the producing party to comply with a request to translate the ESI into 
another language.
32
 
C. The Sedona Guidelines 
Given that the language of Rules 26 and 34 regarding eDiscovery is incredibly broad, 
legal practitioners and courts alike were left without much guidance on how to apply these rules. 
While a number of groups have proposed guidelines on how to treat discovery requests for ESI, 
one particular group, The Sedona Conference, has gained marked traction. The Sedona 
Conference describes themselves as “a charitable, 501(c)(3) non-partisan research and 
educational institute dedicated to the advancement of law and policy in the areas of antitrust law, 
complex litigation and intellectual property rights.”33  
In 2007, the Sedona Conference released a second edition of The Sedona Guidelines: 
Best Practice Guidelines & Commentary for Managing Information & Records in the Electronic 
Age (“the Sedona Guidelines” or “the Guidelines”).34 This document was developed by “some of 
the nation’s finest lawyers, consultants, academics and jurists…[to address] the management of 
electronic information in organization as a result of business, statutory, regulatory and legal 
needs.”35 The Sedona Guidelines consist of five guidelines with about 40 pages of additional 
commentary. The headings of the five guidelines read: 
1. An organization should have reasonable policies and procedures for 
managing its information and records. 
2. An organization’s information and records management policies and 
procedures should be realistic, practical and tailored to the 
circumstances of the organization. 
                                                        
32
 See In re Puerto Rico Elect. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 504-510 (1st Cir. 1989). 
33
 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, https://thesedonaconference.org/faq (last visited November 30, 2013). 
34
 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practice Guidelines & Commentary for Managing 
Information & Records in the Electronic Age (2007), available at https://thesedonaconference.org/download-pub/74 
(last visited Dec. 6, 2013). 
35
 Id. at iii. 
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3. An organization need not retain all electronic information ever 
generated or received. 
4. An organization adopting an information and records management 
policy should also develop procedures that address the creation, 
identification, retrieval and ultimate disposition or destruction of 
information and records. 
5. An organization’s policies and procedures must mandate the 
suspension of ordinary destruction practices and procedures as 
necessary to comply with preservation obligations related to actual or 
reasonably anticipated litigation, government investigation or audit.
36
 
 
While these headings do not fully elucidate the full contents of the Guidelines, further discussion 
is outside the scope of this article.
37
 Any relevant sub-sections of the Guidelines will be 
addressed in context, supra. 
II. EDISCOVERY AND TECHNOLOGY ASSISTED REVIEW 
As this article has stated, eDiscovery has forced the legal community to grapple with a 
number of issues, chiefly: the incredible magnitude of ESI, the cost associated with producing 
ESI, and which party should bear that cost. This section will first discuss the history of 
eDiscovery and subsequently delve into the contents of an emerging eDiscovery tool known as 
“technology assisted review” or “predictive coding”. 
A. History 
Salient to this section is the fact that the Supreme Court has consistently held that “the 
responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests” unless a judge 
deems that the production would involve “undue burden or expense.”38 This is pertinent since 
prior to 1970, when electronically stored documents were deemed discoverable, legal 
practitioners had little guidance on how to treat their clients’ ESI. As the scope of discoverable 
                                                        
36
 Id. at iv-v. 
37
 For more information concerning the contents of the Sedona Guidelines, see Id. at 11-51. 
38
 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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ESI was expanded, the Rules and procedures around eDiscovery became more complex.
39
 Legal 
scholars will agree that the dawn of modern eDiscovery practice began when Judge Scheindlin of 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York decided Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC (“Zubulake I”), the first of five opinions issued relating to eDiscovery in that 
case.
40
 In addition to providing legal practitioners with a port in a storm of uncertain eDiscovery 
practices, Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in Zubulake I has become highly precedential in 
determining whether a party has sufficiently satisfied Rule 26 in their production of ESI. In this 
seminal opinion, under the rubric reprinted below, Judge Scheindlin assessed whether the 
producing party’s costs in aggregating and producing the relevant ESI should be shifted to the 
receiving party. In her opinion, Judge Scheindlin divided media capable of storing ESI into five 
categories. If the ESI is contained in (1) active, online data, (2) near-line data, or (3) in an offline 
storage archive, the ESI is discoverable without warranting a shift in the cost of production.
41
 
However, if the ESI is stored on (4) backup tapes or the ESI itself can reasonably be classified as 
(5) “erased, fragmented, or damaged data,” a seven-factor cost-shifting analysis should be 
employed.
42
 These seven factors are as follows:  
1.  The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information; 
2.  The availability of such information from other sources; 
3.  The total cost of production, compared to the amount in 
controversy; 
4.  The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to 
each party; 
5.  The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive 
to do so; 
                                                        
39
 See generally, Robert D. Brownstone, Preserve or Perish; Destroy or Drown—Ediscovery Morphs Into Electronic 
Information Management, 8 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: 
Regulating and Sanctioning Pre-Litigation Spoliation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005 (2011). 
40
 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
41
 Id. at 320. 
42
 Id. at 316. 
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6.  The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
7.  The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
43
 
In 2003, only 1% of documents generated by businesses were produced in paper format without 
an electronic backup.
44
 One can expect that with the rise of both processing and connectivity 
speeds, the amount of ESI has only grown in the past decade. In response to the ever-increasing 
magnitude of ESI, coupled with this risk of the receiving party bearing the cost of production, 
new tools for addressing this problem were developed to cull the relevant ESI from the 
irrelevant.
45
  
In 2008, technology assisted review, also known as “predictive coding,” was born.46 
Many people disagree on an exact definition of predictive coding;
47
 however, this article submits 
that predictive coding is adequately described as a computer, which, with the help of an attorney, 
employs machine-learning techniques to identify and separate relevant pieces of ESI from a 
given preassembled dataset.
48
  A highly technical discussion is contained in this part, supra; 
however, for the sake of clarity a cursory summary is prudent: typically, a predictive coding 
analysis begins with an attorney assembling all potentially relevant pieces of ESI into a single 
database and then out of a randomly selected sampling, the attorney identifies what documents  
are relevant. Once this is performed, the computer uses the documents that the attorney identified 
as relevant to draw conclusions about what made those documents relevant. Multiple iterations 
of this process occur until the computer’s predictions are, in the attorney’s opinion, sufficiently 
                                                        
43
 Id. at 322. 
44
 Robert D. Brownstone, Preserve or Perish; Destroy or Drown—Ediscovery Morphs Into Electronic Information 
Management, 8 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and 
Sanctioning Pre-Litigation Spoliation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005 (2011). 
45
 See supra, Part II(B) (While technology assisted review is capable of reducing the costs associated with discovery, 
it can still be quite expensive). 
46
 See Johnathan Jenkins, What Can Information Technology Do for Law?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 589, 596 (2008). 
47
 See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Predictive Coding: A Rose by Any Other Name, (March 2012), 
http://www.senseient.com/storage/articles/Predictive_Coding.pdf. 
48
 See generally, Id. 
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accurate.
49
 The attorney determines sufficiency by considering whether s/he has vetted the 
documents to an extent that may be considered a “reasonable effort,” pursuant to Rule 26.50 Once 
the attorney believes the computer has learned to adequately determine relevancy within the 
randomly selected datasets, the computer is instructed to apply its learning to the entire dataset. 
Ultimately, if the attorney has properly trained the computer, this action will result in separating 
all of the relevant documents from the irrelevant ones.
51
  
For some time, whether an attorney using predictive coding complied with the 
requirements of Rule 26 was unresolved. The first indication of its acceptability for this purpose 
came in 2011 from Judge Peck, also a Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, In 2011, Judge Peck published an article advocating the use of predictive 
coding.
52
 In that article, he indicated that in determining whether to allow a party to use 
technology assisted review, a court will consider (1) how the seed set is created, (2) whether the 
seed set is discoverable, (3) the prediction score threshold for production, (4) the appropriate 
confidence level and interval, and (5) where subsequent manual review is appropriate.
53
 The 
following section provides an in-depth review of how one vendor’s predictive coding software 
production of a final set of ESI that was deemed to be fully responsive, avoid duplicative 
production, and prevent the involuntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Of course, 
achieving these goals when working with a large dataset is no trivial endeavor. 
                                                        
49
 See Nicholas M. Pace & Laura Zakaras, Where the Money Goes, Understanding Litigant Expenditures for 
Producing Electronic Discovery, (2012), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf 
50
 Ralph Losey, Day Nine of a Predictive Coding Narrative: A scary search for false-negatives, a comparison of my 
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B. Walkthrough 
As this section details the steps of a predictive coding analysis, consider how similar the 
attorney’s role in this process is to that in traditional document review. This similarity should 
inform a decision about whether predictive coding can sufficiently meet the burdens set forth in 
Rules 26 and 34. Thus, it is important to finely detail these steps so that any potential problems 
can be underscored. This article opines that, provided that an attorney makes relevancy 
determinations in good faith, predictive coding can certainly meet the burdens stated in Rules 26 
and 34. 
Providing an in-depth discussion of a technology assisted review presents two major 
challenges. The first is that any attorney that has performed a technology assisted review for a 
client is bound by the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, the attorney cannot disclose in any 
meaningful detail their experience with predictive coding technology. The other problem is that 
the fierce competition between technology assisted review vendors is fierce, which gives them 
pause when disclosing their particular culling methods; lest they give the competition an avenue 
to gain a competitive advantage.
54
 Fortunately, one such individual is willing to bear the risk of 
disclosing his experience with predictive coding. Ralph Losey, a practicing attorney who 
specializes in eDiscovery, details his efforts in conducting a technology assisted review in a 
seven-part post on his blog, “e-Discovery Team.”55  
                                                        
54
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Losey begins his discussion by detailing the above mentioned problems and preparing the 
reader for a “blow-by-blow, detailed description of a large legal search and review project of any 
kind, much less a predictive coding project.”56 Losey uses a sample set of 699,082 employee 
emails and attachments associated with the scandal surrounding the 2001 bankruptcy of the 
Enron Corporation to look for any evidence relating to involuntary terminations.
57
 The entire 
dataset consisted of approximately 43 GB of emails and attachments, although the analysis 
excluded any foreign language documents.
58
  
Losey focused his search efforts on determining the discrepancies between voluntary and 
involuntary terminations.
59
 The entire technology assisted review took nine days to complete. 
This article will discuss his findings chronologically. Losey began by orienting himself with the 
program and selecting five categories for the computer to list the documents in.
60
 These 
categories consisted of (1) irrelevant, (2) undetermined, (3) relevant, (4) highly relevant, as a 
subset of relevant, and (5) privileged. Next, a random sample of 1,507 documents
61
 was prepared 
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by the predictive coding software for Losey to personally review and categorize into the above 
categories.
62
 This review only yielded two relevant documents. Upon the completion of Losey’s 
review of this first seed set, the predictive coding software was ready to make a first pass at the 
entire dataset.
63
 
The percentage of relevant documents is known as the “prevalence,” “density rate” or 
“yield.”64 For this first seed set, the prevalence was approximately 0.13%, suggesting that there 
exist 928 (0.0013 * 699082 = 928) relevant documents in the entire dataset, although with a ±3% 
confidence interval this number could be as high as 21,881 (3.0013 * 699028 = 21881).
65 “This 
number represents a loose target or general goal for the search” and, while it is not required in a 
technology assisted review, Losey suggests calculating this value as a best practice.
66
  
Losey began the following day by reviewing the 711 documents that contained the word 
“firing.” Interestingly, Enron employees used the word “firing” to refer to starting a coal furnace, 
yielding many false positives. This is an excellent illustration of why technology assisted review 
is technology assisted review; a computer is not able recognize the “flexibility of language.”67  
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Losey then used a suite of tools to conduct what he refers to as a “multimodal” search 
plan.
68
 This included searching through the entire dataset using a Parametric Boolean Keyword 
search, a standard keyword search algorithm; a tool included in the software for identifying near-
identical documents; and another tool included in the software for identifying good “training 
document” candidates. 69  The tool for identifying near-identical documents brought the total 
number of identified relevant documents to 26, including one highly relevant document. 
The third day of Losey’s analysis was spent on running the auxiliary searches listed 
above on the 26 relevant documents, yielding about 1,500 additional documents which, after 
review, brought the total of relevant documents to 55, plus an additional 8 highly relevant 
documents.
70
 Losey then searched through additional documents that the computer believed were 
associated with the additional 8 highly relevant documents, parsing those documents through 
various filters entitled such things as: “duplicates,” “threads and attachments,” and “near-
duplicates,” among other things.71 As the name states, the “duplicates” filter searched the entire 
dataset for any documents that are identical to a document that is being analyzed.
72
 The “thread” 
search filter provided the entire email chain that the relevant document was a part of.
73
 Due to 
the nature of the documents being searched (emails), the thread search filter produced many 
relevant results since any email that is relevant is likely to be part of an entire relevant email 
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chain. Note that Losey did not specify whether he marked any attachments as relevant, which 
could have affected on the accuracy of his relevancy determinations (e.g. an attachment might 
give context to an email rendering it relevant or irrelevant).
74
 After 3 hours of review by Losey, 
this search yielded an additional 6 highly relevant documents. Upon the identification of these 
documents, the computer was instructed to create another sampling to be used as an additional 
training set.
75
 After this process yielded 6 additional relevant documents, a training set was 
created by the computer including a mix of random documents and documents marked by 
Losey.
76
  
On the fifth day of review, Losey noted that this third training iteration failed to allow the 
computer to parse through the “grey areas” of relevancy.77 These endeavors brought Losey’s 
total billable hours to 25.
78
 The sixth day consisted of running the previously identified 
documents through the same filters that were used on the fourth day of Losey’s analysis.79 At the 
end of the sixth day, 289 relevant documents had been identified.
80
   
One the seventh day, Losey ran another training session, personally analyzing a group of 
200 documents, 90% of which the computer believed to fall into a grey area and also expanded 
the parameters of the underlying keyword search to include the terms “severance,” “layoff,” and 
“laid off.”81 After the documents produced by these efforts were sorted into the proper categories, 
adding hundreds of more training documents, a fourth training round was commenced.
82
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At this point, the computer was getting better at finding relevant documents, although 
only 415 relevant documents had been identified – a number well short of the 928 initially 
predicted.
83
 Further, Losey noted that at this point, the computer is beginning to identify 
documents that Losey had not considered (e.g. Documents pertaining to bankruptcy firings). 
However, because the computer was getting better at predicting relevancy, Losey’s input had to 
be more nuanced in order to allow the computer to distinguish between documents that were not 
clearly relevant or irrelevant.
84
 After another training session, Losey decided that, barring the 
final search turning up significant false-negatives, his technology assisted review would be 
complete. As Losey notes, “[r]easonable efforts are required, not perfection.”85  
At this point, over the course of 9 days and merely 52 billable hours, a dataset of 699,082 
documents was searched by one man assisted by technology.  
Losey opined that even at double his normal billable hourly rate, predictive coding will 
save the client 92% over an attorney personally reviewing the documents at $250/hour.
86
 Note 
that there is an important caveat regarding Losey’s calculation – that it did not include the costs 
associated with the vendor hosting the files or the actual cost of using the software. That being 
said, Losey noted that the aforementioned “92% savings is not possible under real world 
conditions,” but he suggested that predictive coding realistically offers between 50% and 75% 
savings.
87
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III. RELEVANT CASE LAW ADDRESSING PREDICTIVE CODING 
This section discusses the court’s treatment of the interplay of technology assisted review 
and eDiscovery. As a threshold matter, it is pertinent to note that the below analyzed cases were 
decided under the current Rule 26, where the scope of production should be proportional to the 
needs of the case only when ordered by the court.
88
 The fact that the current Rule 26 was in 
effect at the time the below cases were decided does not affect the below analyses. This paper 
now lays out, chronologically, the relevant caselaw. 
A. Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 868 F. Supp.2d 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
This has quickly become the landmark case regarding the use of predictive coding, 
primarily due to the outspoken support of predictive coding by Federal Magistrate Judge Peck, 
the Magistrate assigned to this case. The legal community’s reliance on this case is further 
evidenced by the extensive treatment the Court gave predictive coding therein.
89
  
Da Silva Moore was a federal employment discrimination case brought alleging that 
Publicis Groupe, a large advertising and public relations firm, and its American subsidiary, 
MSLGroup Americas (“MSL”), were reserving senior management positions for male 
employees only.
90
 Da Silva Moore was a female employed at MSL for six years.
91
 Throughout 
those years she was promoted from “director” to “managing director” to “global director;” 
however, despite her advancing to seemingly more impressive titles, her positions never garnered 
any real power.
92
 In fact, not only was she not given any real power, but upon returning from 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
discoveryteam.com/2012/08/05/day-nine-of-a-predictive-coding-narrative-a-scary-search-for-false-negatives-a-
comparison-of-my-car-with-the-griswolds-and-a-moral-dilemma/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2013). 
88
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
89
 Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 868 F. Supp. 2d 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
90
 Complaint at 1, Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 868 F. Supp.2d 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-01279-
ALC-AJP). 
91
 Id. at 6. 
92
 Id. 
 
 
22 
 
maternity leave, she was promptly terminated.
93
 Upon said termination, Da Silva Moore brought 
a class action suit against the PR firm on behalf of all females employed in Publicis’ public 
relations group.
94
 
Defendants intended to utilize predictive coding to limit their cost of production to no 
more than $200,000.
95
 Plaintiffs generally agreed that Defendants should be allowed to use 
predictive coding; however, there were serious disagreements as to what protocols were to be 
implemented.
96
 Some of these disputes were solved by a Judge-ordered compromise, but in other 
instances the Court held that certain requests would be treated more appropriately with 
alternative methods of production (i.e. something other than predictive coding). One such 
example dealt with the files of MSL’s CEO, which were primarily in French.97 Due to the 
difficulties in establishing relevancy determinations across languages, the CEO’s documents 
were removed from the scope of predictive coding.
98
  
One law review article contended that “[a]lthough Judge Peck emphasized in his decision 
that the Plaintiffs were not adamantly opposed to all forms of predictive coding, it is clear that 
his specific order regarding the use of predictive coding was made over Plaintiff’s frequently 
repeated objections.”99 That being said, Judge Peck emphasized that parties should strive to work 
together in finding acceptable parameters.
100
 Further, Judge Peck made no representations that 
the use of predictive coding complies with the scope of Rule 26.
101
 This question remained 
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unsolved at the time this article was written, although the following cases begin to tease out the 
important issues. 
However, despite these unanswered questions, Da Silva Moore still serves as an authority 
in a glut of opinions grappling with the use of predictive coding in litigation. This is because 
Judge Peck’s opinion was “the first federal case where Predictive Coding use will be adopted by 
both the court and the parties…”102 Thus, future cases involving predictive coding, discussed 
supra, turn to Da Silva Moore for guidance. 
B. Global Aerospace, Inc. v. Landow Aviation, No. CL 61040, 2012 WL 1431215 
(Va. Cir. Ct. April 23, 2012) 
Here, three hangars in the Dulles, VA airport collapsed during a snowstorm.
103
 This case 
is the consolidation of a number of lawsuits arising out of that incident. In complying with initial 
discovery requests, Landow moved the Court for an order allowing it to use predictive coding 
after a number of Plaintiffs argued against their use.
104
 As part of Landow’s motion, they agreed 
to produce the seed set as well as logs of privileged and sensitive documents.
105
 This disclosure 
would enable Plaintiffs to object to any of the parameters used in the predictive coding analysis. 
In support of its motion, Landow argued that they could produce more relevant documents at a 
fraction of the cost and a fraction of the time.
106
 Plaintiffs argued that while technology assisted 
review can expedite the discovery process, it should supplement traditional proceedings, not 
replace them.
107
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Ultimately, in allowing Landow to use predictive coding, Judge Chamblin cited the 
Sedona Principles.
108
 However, Judge Chamblin, like Judge Peck in Da Silva Moore, left the 
door open for Plaintiffs to challenge the “completeness or the contents of the production” later in 
the litigation.
109
 
C. Kleen Products v. Packaging Corp. of America, No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 
4498465 (N.D. Ill. Sept 28, 2012) 
This case involves a Sherman Act antitrust action against Packaging Corporation of 
America, a manufacturer of corrugated cardboard.
110
 As part of the initial discovery productions, 
the Plaintiffs motioned for an order mandating that the Defendants use alternative technology 
(e.g. predictive coding) as part of their initial productions as opposed to mere keyword 
searching.
111
 Of note here is that when Plaintiffs moved the court, Defendants had already 
produced a significant amount of documents in accordance with the original discovery plan.
112
  
In determining whether to order the Defendants to use predictive coding, Judge Nolan 
heard reports from experts about the adequacy of the Defendant’s production.113 Judge Nolan, 
like Judge Peck in Da Silva Moore, stressed that the parties should work together to determine 
how discovery of ESI should proceed, stating that a “mutually agreeable approach based on what 
Defendants had already implemented was preferable” to starting from scratch.114 Ultimately, 
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Judge Nolan based her decision on the Sedona Conference Guidelines,
115
 noting that accuracy 
and quality are what should be strived for in assessing the sufficiency of discovery 
productions.
116
 Therefore, Judge Nolan held that predictive coding need not be applied to 
anything that had been previously produced, but left the door open to apply predictive coding to 
future discovery requests. 
Kleen Products shows that while the court has a favorable position regarding the use of 
predictive coding, it will not bend over backwards to allow its use, particularly when the parties 
have already agreed to alternative parameters to identify and produce relevant ESI. This is, in 
part, due to the undue burdens that the defendant would have to bear by repeating their entire 
eDiscovery process from scratch. 
D. EORHB, Inc. v. HOA Holdings, LLC, No. 7409-VCL, 2012 WL 4896670 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 15, 2012) 
This action pertains to a commercial indemnification dispute regarding the sale of a 
Hooters™ restaurant chain.117 This case is unique because it was the first instance of a court 
ordering, sua sponte, the use of predictive coding.
118
 Not only did Vice Chancellor Laster order 
that the two parties use predictive coding, but he also ordered that both parties use the same 
vendor.
119
 In endorsing the use of predictive coding on a motion for summary judgment, Vice 
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Chancellor Laster wrote, “I would like you all, if you do not want to use predictive coding, to 
show cause why this is not a case where predictive coding is the way to go.”120 
This case is important, not merely for its implementation of predictive coding, but also as 
a showing of yet another state court strongly endorsing its use. This is particularly important 
because the Delaware chancery court is one of the most active business dockets in the nation, 
indicating that Vice Chancellor Laster’s endorsements will have meaningful consequences on a 
national scale.
121
 
E. In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation, No. 3:12-
MD-2391, 2013 WL 1729682 (N.D. Indiana April 18, 2013) 
In this consolidated products liability litigation, Judge Miller rejected the Plaintiffs’ 
demand to redo the Defendant’s discovery production halfway through the discovery process.122 
The Defendant had originally culled its potentially responsive documents from 19.5 million to 
3.9 million through simple keyword searches.
123
 Defendants then removed all duplicate 
documents to reduce the number of potentially relevant documents to 2.5 million.
124
 Predictive 
coding was then run on the remaining 2.5 million documents. Halfway through this process, 
Plaintiffs moved the court to have predictive coding applied to the entire dataset, which consisted 
of 19.5 million documents.
125
 
In rejecting Plaintiff’s motion, Judge Miller noted that “[t]he issue before me today isn’t 
whether predictive coding is a better way of doing things than keyword searching prior to 
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predictive coding. I must decide whether Biomet’s procedure satisfies its discovery obligations 
and, if so, whether it must also do what the [Plaintiffs seek].”126  Informing Judge Miller’s 
decision were Rules 26(b) and 34(b)(2), as well as the Sedona Guidelines. Judge Miller found 
that Biomet “complies fully with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b) and 
34(b)(2).”127 Further, Judge Miller noted that Biomet’s actions in responding to the Plaintiffs’ 
discovery requests did not run afoul of the Sedona Guidelines either.
128
 The Plaintiffs’ “request 
that Biomet go back to Square One…and institute predictive coding at that earlier stage sits 
uneasily with the proportionality standard in Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”129 Thus, the Plaintiffs’ motion 
was denied and the Defendants were allowed to proceed with discovery as planned. However, 
while Judge Miller held in favor of proceeding with discovery as the parties originally planned, 
he noted that the Plaintiffs’ argument to restart the discovery proceedings “could carry the day in 
some cases, but this one doesn’t seem to be such a case.”130 
This case is another good illustration of how, while courts do seem to highly favor 
predictive coding, they are reluctant to order predictive coding once a discovery plan has been 
agreed upon by both parties and has begun to be implemented. Further, this case underscores the 
considerations present in the proposed amendments to Rule 26. 
F. In re Actos (Piaglitazone) Products Liability Litigation, No. 6:11-md-2299, 2013 
WL 4776346 (W.D. La. Sept 3, 2013) 
This case is another consolidation, this time of pretrial proceedings from eleven different 
civil actions across multiple districts.
131
 Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants attempted to 
conceal the fact that one of their products, a type-2 diabetes drug, increases users’ risk of 
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developing bladder cancer.
132
 After meeting with a Special Master, both parties agreed that the 
seed set should be built from “the custodial files of 43 individuals who are (or were) members of 
the sales forces of Takeda and Lilly.”133  
In arriving at the appropriate scope of discovery, the Court assessed four factors; (1) the 
needs of the case and the importance of the issues at stake in the action, (2) the amount in 
controversy, (3) the parties’ resources, and (4) the importance of this discovery in resolving the 
issues.
134
 Further, the Court recognized the undue expense and burden of allowing the Plaintiffs 
to have full reign over the scope of what should be produced.
135
 
This litigation is worth noting for its high level of detail regarding the protocol that the 
parties must follow during discovery.
136
 Further, the discovery order expressly lays out the 
details of how the predictive coding process will actually be implemented.
137
 In re Actos is an 
exemplary display of the Court’s desire to have the parties arrive at an acceptable discovery plan 
together while minimizing the time and expense associated with producing the relevant ESI. 
While the above cases have had the benefit of predictive coding, many more cases go 
through the eDiscovery process without any sort of technology assisted review. As noted in the 
Introduction, infra, requests for, and the production of, ESI has been greatly abused. The 
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery, discussed 
supra, hope to address some of these issues without the use predictive coding technology. 
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IV. THE MERITS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 26 INFORMED BY PRACTICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Throughout America’s history, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended 
to stay relevant as well as facilitate the judicial process. While the most recent amendments to 
the Rules were in 2006, the aforementioned proposed amendments are currently awaiting 
Congress’ approval.138  
Rule 26, as was mentioned above, is the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that governs the 
scope of initial productions in discovery.
139
 While this article only examines the Federal Rules, 
many states will likely adopt the revisions to the Federal Rules within their own State Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The above proposed amendments have two goals in mind –early and effective 
case management and reducing the cost of discovery (i.e. eDiscovery) by maintaining 
proportionality.
140
  
The amendments set out to achieve these goals in a number of ways. First is the linking 
of Rule 26(f) with Federal Rule of Evidence 502. The inclusion of a provision in Rule 26(f) that 
requires adversaries to agree to a system of asserting attorney-client privilege over accidently 
produced documents lessens the risk of involuntarily waiving the privilege. This further reduces 
the costs associated with reviewing documents. 
Second, this type of practice is in line with the case law discussion in Part III, infra, since 
the cases focus on cooperation between the parties and avoiding undue expense. As the 
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committee notes state, pursuant to the Rule 26(f) amendment, “[c]oncrete disputes as to the 
scope of discovery could then be brought to the attention of the court at a Rule 16 conference.”141 
Third, regarding cost-reduction considerations, by allowing the courts to, on their own 
volition and without motion, limit the scope of discovery with the cost-benefit analysis of current 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), the costs associated with assembling and processing large amounts of ESI 
could be tempered. Without having to seek a court order to reasonably limit the scope, from the 
beginning of discovery the costs associated with discovery can be inhibited. According to a 
“large-scale closed-case study done by the Federal Judicial Center for the Duke 
Conference…[the rule] is not invoked often enough to damped excessive discovery demands.”142 
This proposition is bolstered by the fact that court-controlled discovery is now authorized to 
extend to “any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”143 While procedure is 
important, as the scale of litigation grows, the rules must adapt to help prevent further congestion 
on an already crammed judicial docket. For this reason, as well as the cost-reducing aspect of 
moving Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(ii), this amendment is warranted. 
Regarding Rule 34, the committee notes state that the proposed amendments are “aimed 
at reducing the potential to impose unreasonable burden by objections to requests to produce.”144 
In sum, the largest change to Rule 34 relates to the amount and type of information that a party 
must include in an objection to a given discovery request. This is embodied in the addition of 
language that requires that objections be stated “with specificity.”145  
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The aforementioned proposed amendments take a much needed step towards stopping 
abuse of the American discovery system. By amending the rules to emphasize that a Judge 
should limit the scope of discovery, the Judicial Advisory Committee not only puts litigants on 
notice that overly broad eDiscovery requests will not be tolerated, but also informs federal courts 
that affirmative measures should be taken to prevent this abuse. Given the congestion on the 
federal docket and the incredible expense associated with large litigations, this amendment is 
appropriate.  
Further, by mandating that a party objecting to a discovery request must do so with 
particularity, the proposed amendments undercut any attempt to raise frivolous objections, and 
force an objecting party to not only object with particularity, but to also propose an acceptable 
alternative. This will certainly speed up the already lengthy discovery process and, as such, this 
proposition is also warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
This article examined two potential solutions to the current abuse of eDiscovery – one by 
vendors of technology assisted review, the other by the legislative branch. While the two parties 
take different approaches to addressing this issue, both target the proportionality requirements of 
Rule 26. The two approaches might seem at odds with each other, but in fact, the use of 
technology assisted review falls squarely within the proposed amendments to Rules 26 and 34 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That being said, technology assisted review has yet to be 
addressed by any United States Court of Appeals, and the proposed amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have yet to be adopted. Thus, only the passage of time will allow a 
legal scholar to know the full effect of these two approaches, but this author is hopeful that they 
will be able to quell the malfeasance in modern eDiscovery practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provision Governing Discovery 
 
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES. 
(1) Initial Disclosure. 
(A) In General. Except as exempted by Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise stipulated or ordered by 
the court, a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties: 
(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have 
discoverable information—along with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party 
may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; 
(ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents, electronically stored 
information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control 
and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; 
(iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must 
also make available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other 
evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation 
is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance agreement under which an 
insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. 
(B) Proceedings Exempt from Initial Disclosure. The following proceedings are exempt from 
initial disclosure: 
(i) an action for review on an administrative record; 
(ii) a forfeiture action in rem arising from a federal statute; 
(iii) a petition for habeas corpus or any other proceeding to challenge a criminal conviction or 
sentence; 
(iv) an action brought without an attorney by a person in the custody of the United States, a 
state, or a state subdivision; 
(v) an action to enforce or quash an administrative summons or subpoena; 
(vi) an action by the United States to recover benefit payments; 
(vii) an action by the United States to collect on a student loan guaranteed by the United 
States; 
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(viii) a proceeding ancillary to a proceeding in another court; and 
(ix) an action to enforce an arbitration award. 
(C) Time for Initial Disclosures—In General. A party must make the initial disclosures at or 
within 14 days after the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time is set by stipulation or 
court order, or unless a party objects during the conference that initial disclosures are not 
appropriate in this action and states the objection in the proposed discovery plan. In ruling on the 
objection, the court must determine what disclosures, if any, are to be made and must set the time 
for disclosure. 
(D) Time for Initial Disclosures—For Parties Served or Joined Later. A party that is first served 
or otherwise joined after the Rule 26(f) conference must make the initial disclosures within 30 days 
after being served or joined, unless a different time is set by stipulation or court order. 
(E) Basis for Initial Disclosure; Unacceptable Excuses. A party must make its initial disclosures 
based on the information then reasonably available to it. A party is not excused from making its 
disclosures because it has not fully investigated the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of 
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures. 
(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony. 
(A) In General. In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), a party must disclose to 
the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. 
(B) Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the 
court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the 
witness—if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case 
or one whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony. The report 
must contain: 
(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for 
them; 
(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; 
(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; 
(iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 
years; 
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition; and 
(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case. 
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(C) Witnesses Who Do Not Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by 
the court, if the witness is not required to provide a written report, this disclosure must state: 
(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence underFederal Rule of 
Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and 
(ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify. 
(D) Time to Disclose Expert Testimony. A party must make these disclosures at the times and in 
the sequence that the court orders. Absent a stipulation or a court order, the disclosures must be 
made: 
(i) at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial; or 
(ii) if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter 
identified by another party under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C), within 30 days after the other party's 
disclosure. 
(E) Supplementing the Disclosure. The parties must supplement these disclosures when required 
under Rule 26(e). 
(3) Pretrial Disclosures. 
(A) In General. In addition to the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and (2), a party must 
provide to the other parties and promptly file the following information about the evidence that it 
may present at trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each 
witness—separately identifying those the party expects to present and those it may call if the need 
arises; 
(ii) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony the party expects to present by 
deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent parts of the deposition; 
and 
(iii) an identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other 
evidence—separately identifying those items the party expects to offer and those it may offer if 
the need arises. 
(B) Time for Pretrial Disclosures; Objections. Unless the court orders otherwise, these 
disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days after they are made, unless the 
court sets a different time, a party may serve and promptly file a list of the following objections: any 
objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under Rule 
26(a)(3)(A)(ii); and any objection, together with the grounds for it, that may be made to the 
admissibility of materials identified under Rule 26(a)(3)(A)(iii). An objection not so made—except 
for one underFederal Rule of Evidence 402 or 403—is waived unless excused by the court for good 
cause. 
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(4) Form of Disclosures. Unless the court orders otherwise, all disclosures under Rule 26(a) must be 
in writing, signed, and served. 
(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. 
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or 
defense—including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any 
discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery 
is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C). 
(2) Limitations on Frequency and Extent. 
(A) When Permitted. By order, the court may alter the limits in these rules on the number of 
depositions and interrogatories or on the length of depositions under Rule 30. By order or local rule, 
the court may also limit the number of requests under Rule 36. 
(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party need not provide discovery 
of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective 
order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless 
order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the 
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery. 
(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of 
discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that: 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from 
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by 
discovery in the action; or 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering 
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. 
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and 
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its 
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). 
But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if: 
 
 
37 
 
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and 
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, 
without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means. 
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must protect 
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's 
attorney or other representative concerning the litigation. 
(C) Previous Statement. Any party or other person may, on request and without the required 
showing, obtain the person's own previous statement about the action or its subject matter. If the 
request is refused, the person may move for a court order, and Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of 
expenses. A previous statement is either: 
(i) a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or approved; or 
(ii) a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording—or a 
transcription of it—that recites substantially verbatim the person's oral statement. 
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. 
(A) Deposition of an Expert Who May Testify. A party may depose any person who has been 
identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a 
report from the expert, the deposition may be conducted only after the report is provided. 
(B) Trial-Preparation Protection for Draft Reports or 
Disclosures. Rules 26(b)(3)(A)and (B) protect drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 
26(a)(2), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded. 
(C) Trial-Preparation Protection for Communications Between a Party's Attorney and Expert 
Witnesses. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect communications between the party's attorney and any 
witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the 
communications, except to the extent that the communications: 
(i) relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony; 
(ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in 
forming the opinions to be expressed; or 
(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in 
forming the opinions to be expressed. 
(D) Expert Employed Only for Trial Preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories 
or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially 
employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected 
to be called as a witness at trial. But a party may do so only: 
(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or 
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(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to 
obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(E) Payment. Unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking 
discovery: 
(i) pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 
26(b)(4)(A) or (D); and 
(ii) for discovery under (D), also pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses it 
reasonably incurred in obtaining the expert's facts and opinions. 
(5) Claiming Privilege or Protecting Trial-Preparation Materials. 
(A) Information Withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by 
claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the 
party must: 
(i) expressly make the claim; and 
(ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or 
disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or 
protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim. 
(B) Information Produced. If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege 
or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that 
received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly 
return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose 
the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if 
the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the information to the court 
under seal for a determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the information until 
the claim is resolved. 
(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. 
(1) In General. A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective 
order in the court where the action is pending—or as an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, 
in the court for the district where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification 
that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an 
effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
including one or more of the following: 
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; 
(B) specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery; 
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party seeking discovery; 
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(D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to 
certain matters; 
(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted; 
(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order; 
(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way; and 
(H) requiring that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information in sealed 
envelopes, to be opened as the court directs. 
(2) Ordering Discovery. If a motion for a protective order is wholly or partly denied, the court may, 
on just terms, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. 
(3) Awarding Expenses. Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of expenses. 
(d) TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DISCOVERY. 
(1) Timing. A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as 
required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 
26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order. 
(2) Sequence. Unless, on motion, the court orders otherwise for the parties’ and witnesses’ 
convenience and in the interests of justice: 
(A) methods of discovery may be used in any sequence; and 
(B) discovery by one party does not require any other party to delay its discovery. 
(e) SUPPLEMENTING DISCLOSURES AND RESPONSES. 
(1) In General. A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—or who has responded to an 
interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission—must supplement or correct its 
disclosure or response: 
(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response 
is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or 
(B) as ordered by the court. 
(2) Expert Witness. For an expert whose report must be disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the party's 
duty to supplement extends both to information included in the report and to information given during 
the expert's deposition. Any additions or changes to this information must be disclosed by the time the 
party's pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due. 
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(f) CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOVERY. 
(1) Conference Timing. Except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 
26(a)(1)(B) or when the court orders otherwise, the parties must confer as soon as practicable—and in 
any event at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due 
under Rule 16(b). 
(2) Conference Content; Parties’ Responsibilities. In conferring, the parties must consider the nature 
and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case; 
make or arrange for the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving 
discoverable information; and develop a proposed discovery plan. The attorneys of record and all 
unrepresented parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging the 
conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to 
the court within 14 days after the conference a written report outlining the plan. The court may order 
the parties or attorneys to attend the conference in person. 
(3) Discovery Plan. A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and proposals on: 
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under Rule 
26(a), including a statement of when initial disclosures were made or will be made; 
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed, and 
whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or focused on particular issues; 
(C) any issues about disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the 
form or forms in which it should be produced; 
(D) any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, 
including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after production—whether to 
ask the court to include their agreement in an order; 
(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules or by 
local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and 
(F) any other orders that the court should issue under Rule 26(c) or under Rule 16(b) and (c). 
(4) Expedited Schedule. If necessary to comply with its expedited schedule for Rule 
16(b) conferences, a court may by local rule: 
(A) require the parties’ conference to occur less than 21 days before the scheduling conference is 
held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b); and 
(B) require the written report outlining the discovery plan to be filed less than 14 days after the 
parties’ conference, or excuse the parties from submitting a written report and permit them to report 
orally on their discovery plan at the Rule 16(b)conference. 
(g) SIGNING DISCLOSURES AND DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS. 
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(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and 
every discovery request, response, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the 
attorney's own name—or by the party personally, if unrepresented—and must state the signer's address, 
e-mail address, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry: 
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and 
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is: 
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law; 
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and 
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the 
case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action. 
(2) Failure to Sign. Other parties have no duty to act on an unsigned disclosure, request, response, or 
objection until it is signed, and the court must strike it unless a signature is promptly supplied after the 
omission is called to the attorney's or party's attention. 
(3) Sanction for Improper Certification. If a certification violates this rule without substantial 
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the 
party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the violation. 
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APPENDIX B 
Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions; Governing Discovery 
 
 (b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. 
 
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope 
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 
proportional to the needs of the case considering the amount in 
controversy, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, 
and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs 
its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be 
admissible in evidence to be discoverable. — including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or 
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know 
of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order 
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed 
by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).  
 
(2) Limitations on Frequency and Extent.  
 
(A) When Permitted. By order, the court may alter the limits in 
these rules on the number of depositions, and interrogatories, and 
requests for admissions, or on the length of depositions under 
Rule 30. By order or local rule, the court may also limit the 
number of requests under Rule 36.  
* * *   
(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must 
limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by 
these rules or by local rule if it determines that: * * * 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery is outside 
the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1) outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues. 
(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS.  
(1) In General. * * * The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: * * *   
(B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of 
expenses, for the disclosure or discovery;  
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* * *   
(d) TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DISCOVERY.   
(1) Timing. A party may not seek discovery from any source before the 
parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except:   
(A) in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 
26(a)(1)(B),; or   
(B) when authorized by these rules, including Rule 26(d)(2), by 
stipulation, or by court order.  
(2) Early Rule 34 Requests.  
(A) Time to Deliver. More than 21 days after the summons and 
complaint are served on a party, a request under Rule 34 may be 
delivered:  
(i) to that party by any other party, and   
(ii) by that party to any Plaintiff or to any other party 
that has been served.   
(B) When Considered Served. The request is considered as served at the 
first Rule 26(f) conference.   
(2) Sequence. Unless, on motion, the parties stipulate or the 
court orders otherwise for the parties’ and witnesses’ 
convenience and in the interests of justice:  
(A) methods of discovery may be used in any sequence; 
and  
(B) discovery by one party does not require any other 
party to delay its discovery. * * *  
(f) CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOVERY.   
(1) Conference Timing. Except in a proceeding exempted from initial 
disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or * * *   
(3) Discovery Plan. A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and 
proposals on: * * *   
(C) any issues about disclosure, or discovery, or preservation of 
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it 
should be produced;  
(D) any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, including — if the 
parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after production — whether to ask the court to include 
their agreement in an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502; 
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APPENDIX C 
(a) IN GENERAL. A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b): 
(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample 
the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: 
(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, 
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data 
compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if 
necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form; or 
(B) any designated tangible things; or 
(2) to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding 
party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the 
property or any designated object or operation on it. 
(b) PROCEDURE. 
(1) Contents of the Request. The request: 
(A) must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected; 
(B) must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection and for performing the 
related acts; and 
(C) may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced. 
(2) Responses and Objections. 
(A) Time to Respond. The party to whom the request is directed must respond in writing within 
30 days after being served. A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be 
ordered by the court. 
(B) Responding to Each Item. For each item or category, the response must either state that 
inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, 
including the reasons. 
(C) Objections. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of 
the rest. 
(D) Responding to a Request for Production of Electronically Stored Information. The response 
may state an objection to a requested form for producing electronically stored information. If the 
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responding party objects to a requested form—or if no form was specified in the request—the party 
must state the form or forms it intends to use. 
(E) Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored Information. Unless otherwise stipulated 
or ordered by the court, these procedures apply to producing documents or electronically stored 
information: 
(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must 
organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request; 
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored information, a party 
must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable 
form or forms; and 
(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one 
form. 
(c) NONPARTIES. As provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents and 
tangible things or to permit an inspection. 
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APPENDIX D 
(b) PROCEDURE. * * * 
 
(2) Responses and Objections. * * * 
 
(A)  Time to Respond. The party to whom the request is directed must respond in 
writing within 30 days after being served or — if the request was delivered under 
Rule 26(d)(1)(B) — within 30 days after the parties’ first Rule 26(f) conference. 
A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the 
court. 
 
(B)  Responding to Each Item. For each item or category, the response must either 
state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state 
the grounds for objecting to the request with specificity, including the reasons. If 
the responding party states that it will produce copies of documents or of 
electronically stored information instead of permitting inspection, the production 
must be completed no later than the time for inspection stated in the request or a 
later reasonable time stated in the response. 
 
(C)  Objections. An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being 
withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must 
specify the part and permit inspection of the rest. .***  
